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Analytical table of contents 
 
An overview of the arguments of the chapters in the book.  
 
Overview 
 
The Problem of the State provides a new perspective on what the social and political 
sciences can contribute to understandings of the state and the ambivalent place it 
occupies in our collective affairs. Distinguishing two broad conceptual and 
methodological approaches to addressing the problem of how to study the state 
empirically rather than theoretically – the constitutionalist and constructionist 
positions – the author reviews the grounds and limits of both to reveal their 
common assumption: that it is up to the social and political sciences to define what 
the problem of the state is. Building on insights from Marx, Wittgenstein and 
Ethnomethodology, this book frees the study of the state from that limiting 
assumption and advocates a return of the problem to its proper environment, in 
social and political practice. 
 
Foreword 
 
One of the principal points I want to make in the course of the chapters that 
follow is that when the social and political sciences take up the problem of the 
state, they are engaging with that problem as a feature of situated social and 
political practices and rely on methods of understanding which are part of, and so 
trace from, those practices. While the rest of the book addresses the tangles of 
issues that empirical investigations into the problem of the state bring to the fore 
vis-a-vis those situated practices and methods of understanding, this foreword 
previews the argument; sets out where I argue social and political scientists begin 
when they set out to study the state – and where I therefore start in studying them; 
and clarifies where my contribution stands in relation to studies of the state.  
 
Chapter One: The Problem of the State 
in the Social and Political Sciences 
 
In this chapter I set out a broad characterisation of the argument of the book as a 
whole and a guide to the chapters that follow. I introduce the constitutionalist and 
constructionist approaches in turn, setting out the broad bases from which they 
proceed with reference to an example drawn from the work of artist and novelist 
Alasdair Gray. I then offer initial indications of the limitations of both positions as 
well as of the core argument of the book: that the problem of the state should be 
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treated as a problem for the social and political sciences by investigating the ways 
in which it is treated as a problem in and for social and political practice. I will 
argue that recognising this enables us to move beyond the impasses that have 
characterised studies of the state certainly for the last forty years if not much of the 
century before. Studies of the state have traditionally begun by asking who and 
what make up the state – the constitutionalist perspective – but have come to ask, 
more recently, how states come to be made up in the ways that they are – the 
constructionist perspective. However, while asking who, what and how can be 
useful, we also need to ask where, when, under what conditions and for whom 
these questions arise in the context of social and political practices. 
 
Chapter Two: The Matter Thereof and 
the Artificer – Hobbes, Weber and the 
Constitutionalist Approach 
 
At the start of Leviathan, Hobbes famously sets out the nature of his inquiry into 
the state and the problem it must grapple with. He explains it must take into 
account two things: “the matter thereof and the artificer, both which is man”. The 
state is explicitly recognised as a human creation but Hobbes also treats it as 
having an independent existence. Inquiries into the state must, therefore, not just 
examine what the state is, they must also examine how it comes to be constituted 
as such.  
While Hobbes’ treatment is philosophical, it sets the stage for the study of 
the state within the social and political sciences. For much of their histories, they 
too have treated the state as a human creation, one historically anchored in 
distinctive social, cultural, political and economic conditions yet nonetheless having 
an existence over and above them. The state is therefore both socially embedded 
and a thing unto itself. This duality is found in Weber’s work as much as Hobbes’ 
but it is Weber’s formulations that have provided one of the principle 
methodological starting points for empirical studies of the state. Weber’s 
sociological reworking of the problem as introduced by Hobbes thus helped make 
the state investigable.   
Ignoring his more phenomenological pronouncements on the state as an 
oriented to complex of action and interaction, attention has focused on Weber’s 
pithy ideal-typical rendering in ‘Politics as a Vocation’: the state is a human 
community that successfully claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory. One of the most well-known ‘definitions’ in the 
social sciences, it exercises a grip on the imaginations of social and political 
scientists to this day. Most importantly, and despite representing a misreading of 
Weber’s nominalism, it provides the basis for the constitutionalist approach which 
seeks to define what the state is and has to be by exploring the necessary and 
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sufficient conditions of statehood. The basis for the constitutionalist approach is to 
look at what needs to be in place for a state – or a kind of state, such as a 
democratic state or capitalist state – to be a state at all. It does not neglect what 
states do but it treats such matters as constitutionally enabled. The how is, 
therefore, approached via the what, function via structure or form, and it is the 
latter which is treated as analytically primitive. Seen constitutionally, an entity 
cannot be a state unless it has such things, for instance, as a standing army: either 
to maintain law and order, for the neo-Weberians and liberal theorists, or to 
enforce the demands of capital and enforce domination, for the neo-Marxists and 
critical theorists.  
The emphasis on the constitution of the state – the elements upon which it 
is founded, which together make it up and make it possible for it do certain things 
– has produced a number of waves of research, including that grouped together 
under the call to ‘bring the state back in’ in the mid-1980s which involved such 
figures as Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann. 
More recently, Gøsta Esping-Andersen and research inspired by his The Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism on the varieties of capitalist welfare state has helped 
reshape understandings not just of the state but of its relationship to society and 
economy through investigations of the structural role the state plays in different 
political economic contexts. Constitutionalist work has, undoubtedly, produced 
real insights. Nonetheless, it has been subjected to sustained critique. The most 
powerful of those critiques is that presented by Michel Foucault. For Foucault, the 
constitutionalist position was conceptually and methodologically unstable: one 
could not access the what of the state if one relegated the how to a secondary 
position. The chapter ends with an examination of some of the problems that 
result from this methodological prioritisation, suggesting the constitutionalist 
approach has proven illuminating not because of its commitments but in spite of 
them.  
 
Chapter Three: The Government of Men 
and Things – Foucault’s Radical 
Critique of Constitutionalism 
 
This chapter examines Foucault’s break with the constitutionalist position and how 
he sought to re-orient research on the state, best viewed as a set of conceptual and 
methodological proposals rather than substantive points. Foucault notes we talk of 
the state as a complex of men and things but asks ‘what does that mean?’. For 
Foucault, it cannot merely be a structure in which certain functions are housed. 
Not only does the constitutionalist vision offer an over-simplified picture of social 
and political life, it is conceptually and methodologically impoverished. Against the 
ontological certainties that characterise the constitutionalist position, that the what 
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of the state is clearly and easily accessed, Foucault raises a series of epistemological 
objections, variants on the question, ‘how could we possibly know?’. Foucault’s 
radical insight, one which distinguishes his work from others, was that we can only 
talk about the state and its structures – we can only know the state – by virtue of 
arrangements of practices – ways of recording, mapping, documenting, describing, 
counting, weighing, differentiating, classifying and so on – that enable us to treat 
the state as an entity in the first place. The structures of the state are not what 
enable us to talk of the state; rather, we come to know the structures of the state 
through interwoven complexes of ancillary practices upon which the state rests. 
Without them, there is no state – it is a product and we do not understand it unless 
we understand what it is produced by. This is not to say structures are 
unimportant, they patently are. But they are not analytically primitive, they are 
secondary – the constitutionalists, on Foucault’s reading, are wrong. What is more, 
the sense in which they are secondary can be empirically examined: we can see how 
the structures of the state come to acquire their form concretely in different 
contexts and historical periods. The chapter ends by examining what Foucauldian 
studies of the state and state practices promise by way of new insights. 
 
Chapter Four: Problematising the State – 
Historical and Ethnographic Studies of 
State Practices 
 
Following Foucault’s methodological critique of the constitutionalist position 
through, this chapter discusses a body of social and political research which is 
organised around a different way of approaching empirical studies of states and 
governmental practices. That body of work methodologically foregrounds 
construction not constitution. Within it, the state remains a significant focus of 
social and political inquiry but this is a state that is recognised as possessing no 
unambiguous centre, no clearly identifiable loci of control, no core architectures, 
no permanent, fixed boundaries, territorially or organisationally, no settled modes 
of operation, no clear functional characteristics and no ultimately definable 
purpose or telos. Instead of treating Weber’s ideal-type as a methodological 
solution (the constitutionalist position), the ideal-type is treated as posing the 
problem. Rather than use the ideal-type as a definition of the state, the aim is to 
deconstruct the models of statehood it projects. This is achieved by bracketing 
representations (or perhaps better, various acts of representation) of the state as 
the ‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory’, the foremost political institution of 
civil society, and exploring the conditions of their success. In doing so, researchers 
problematise these idealised representations to demonstrate that they represent the 
outcome of, and are made possible by, historically, socially and culturally 
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contingent processes and practices in and through which the territoriality, 
legitimacy, authority and power of the state – Leviathan’s dread properties – have 
taken shape, found voice and been given material form.  
There are two main variants within the field of studies which take this 
approach: those which examine the historical emergence of fields of state practices 
and those which ethnographically examine the workings of the state in the present. 
In the first camp we have studies of governmentality, the state effect and legibility 
projects, such as those undertaken by Philip Corrigan, Derek Sayer, Nikolas Rose, 
Peter Miller, Timothy Mitchell and James Scott (and paralleled by historical-
conceptual work in philosophy such as that of Quentin Skinner among others), 
and in the second we have a diverse body of work by anthropologists such as 
Michael Taussig, James Ferguson, Akhil Gupta, Begoña Aretxaga, Yael Navaro-
Yashin, Veena Das and Matthew Hull as well as ‘ethnographic’ works by 
archaeologists such as Bruce Routledge and Norman Yoffee and the political 
scientists Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes. I will argue these can be separated 
methodologically and not just by focus. The first kind of study begins with specific 
claims advanced by the state and tracks backwards, tracing them to the diffuse sets 
of sites, personnel, bodies of knowledge and objects and technologies from which 
they originated. The second kind of studies begins with specific claims and tracks 
forwards, following the social and cultural careers, trajectories, ‘biographies’, etc., 
of those claims once they have been formulated and advanced. Where the purpose 
of the first kind of study is to find out how various acts of naming the state as 
impersonal power, Hobbes’s ‘Mortall God’, are made possible and to investigate 
what configurations they rest on, the purpose of the second is to find out what 
happens once the state has been accepted as such. These contrasting 
methodological strategies are used to determine what it means to talk of the state 
in particular socio-political contexts.    
 
Chapter Five: The Limits of 
Problematisation – Historical Studies 
and the Divorce of Discourse from 
Practice 
 
As I will begin to show in this chapter by concentrating on historical studies in the 
first instance, the constructionist methodological strategies described in the last 
chapter have their own internal limits and generate conceptual problems of their 
own. A general goal of constructionist studies of the state is to open up the 
analytical room needed to inspect the form, substance, origins and subsequent 
aetiology of the very idea of the state and the claims made about ‘it’ – in terms of 
the loosely-woven complexes of social and political practices they are connected to 
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and anchored in – at different moments in time and space. The purpose of this 
chapter is to turn a critical eye to the ways in which particular constructionist 
studies effect their problematisation of the state. In a context where the 
investigator cannot employ formal means of designating their phenomena in 
advance – in this case, because definitions of the state are held to be problematic – 
the examples they use come to take on a particularly important role. Rather than 
trying to define – in the sense of ‘writing-out’ or ‘telling’ us – what their 
phenomena are, these studies attempt to show their phenomena – to exhibit or 
display how they were recovered in and through their analyses. Although no single, 
unified set of ‘state phenomena’ can be specified, the implication is that the 
phenomena these studies describe – these things and other things like them – 
exemplify what we should be looking for when we address the problem of the 
state. The success of the demonstrations thus hinges on the adequacy of the 
examples. This chapter argues there are several reasons for questioning their 
adequacy on these grounds. Based on five cases drawn from historical research, 
from Foucault, Corrigan and Sayer, Rose and Miller, Miller and Scott respectively, I 
show that the use of examples in constructionist research generates a range of 
internal methodological difficulties, problems and paradoxes. These in turn are 
argued to be indicative of a deeper homology with the constitutionalist position.  
 
Chapter Six: Fictions of Practice – 
Anthropological Accounts and the 
Fabrication of the Real 
 
This chapter further explores the limits of problematisation as a method in 
constructionist studies of the state with a focus on a single case-study analysed by 
James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002). As I will argue, their treatment of that 
case-study exemplifies many of the conceptual and methodological difficulties with 
ethnographically-oriented constructionist studies. The aim, ultimately, in discussing 
this particular study is to show that constructionist and constitutionalist studies 
share a conviction that models represent solutions to the problem of the state. 
There are, of course, differences. Constitutionalist analyses operate on the premise 
that we require a general model to study the state. By contrast, constructionist 
studies argue that we can only study the state by describing how models of the 
state are implicated in the state-making and state-maintaining work of local actors 
in local circumstances – work brought to the fore in constructionist studies. The 
plurality of such models is taken to show that there are many possible approaches 
to handling the problem of the state, an insight that led to the investigation of how 
questions alongside an investigation of the what of the state. Where 
constitutionalists try to keep model building in-house as the preserve of the 
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analyst, therefore, constructionists outsource the analytical work to those being 
studied.  
However, it is only when we generalise from the specific problems members 
of society encounter in actual situations, when we attempt to analytically fix the 
problem of the state in place, that we are tempted to think of models of any sort as 
a solution. If on the other hand, we deny that there is any single, monolithic 
problem of the state, if we resist what Wittgenstein termed the “craving for 
generality” and the “contemptuous attitude towards the particular case” he argued 
it displays, the path is open for investigations of a different sort, investigations that 
do not accord authority to models and so avoid the accompanying conceptual and 
methodological snares and traps. The point of such investigations would not be to 
deny that models can be useful (recognising that they are useful under some 
circumstances, not all). They would, however, undercut attempts to treat the use of 
models as if it were somehow independent of the nexus of social practices and 
circumstantial considerations within which models acquire whatever utility they can 
sometimes have. The critical analysis presented in this chapter sets up the focus of 
the next chapter where an alternative approach to the problem of the state will be 
outlined. 
 
Chapter Seven: The Problem of the State 
Beyond Constitution and Construction 
 
What would an approach to the problem of the state that did not repeat the 
problems of constitutionalism and constructionism look like? In many respects, it 
would be an approach that took Foucault’s radical insights seriously and did not try 
to reserve a position of authority for the researcher. It would instead look to social 
and political practices and attempt to grapple with the sense in which the problem 
of the state is a problem for anyone.  
There is a precursor: Marx’s lengthy exposition of the circumstances that led 
up to the collapse of French parliamentary democracy in 1851, following the 1848 
revolution, and allowed Louis-Napoleon, the then President of the French Second 
Republic, to reclaim the Imperial throne his uncle (Napoleon) had been forced to 
abdicate – The 18th Brumaire. Marx has often been castigated for not offering a 
general theory of the state in his work. The argument here is that this was precisely 
the point. In framing his analysis in the way he did Marx is asking us, as readers, to 
treat what it might mean to describe the state as itself a phenomenon for 
investigation, a problem within political practice, and a problem, moreover, to 
which his own text is explicitly addressed. It is this feature of Marx’s description of 
the French state that is worth concentrating on; namely, its insistence on treating 
the problem of the state in practical political terms. What is most significant about 
Marx’s treatment is that he does not allow us to move from his description to a 
generalised problem of the state, and so blocks attempts to treat the former as a 
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manifestation of the latter. Indeed, one of the lessons of the account is that the 
claim there is a general, transcontextual problem of the state has no content and 
thus lacks an identifiable sense.  
One of the most striking things about The 18th Brumaire is that it is made 
up of unrelentingly detailed descriptions of complex sequences of events, where 
the analytical emphasis continually re-centres on a consideration of what was 
happening at each step within unfolding sequences of practical political action. The 
significance of any one episode within a longer sequence, such as the question of 
who did what when (‘details’ of the sort that are frequently dismissed as trivial by 
many constitutionalists and constructionists alike), can only be determined with 
respect to the manner in which it was seen in practice, by the parties involved, as 
connected to what came before and their orientation to what might come after. In 
other words, to draw on conversation analytic terminology, Marx is showing us 
that some possible next political move by any one of the protagonists became 
intelligible in the context of some identifiably prior move by another. When we 
read The 18th Brumaire as a specifically interactional account of collaboratively 
produced ‘chains’ of political activity, it becomes easier to see why Marx would 
resist the idea that there could be a general problem of the state: to generalise the 
problem would be to divorce it from the environments within which the state 
could come to be a problem for those involved within the political scenarios he is 
examining.  
Marx’s method of analysis in The 18th Brumaire works to prevent the 
severing of contextual ties by building on the observation that determinations 
about the state (its proper scope, role, character, structure, powers, activities, 
jurisdictions, failures, and so on) are made within social and political practices. 
Approached in this way, the objective in Marx’s account then becomes to see how 
such determinations acquire their sense in, through and as part of practical courses 
of action. Marx shows us why we should not try to specify in advance what form 
those determinations will take, where we will find them, or what import they will 
or can have, but instead look to see if, when and how they become relevant in a 
given situation. It is in this sense that the account points us in a very different 
direction to the other forms of investigation that have been examined so far. Marx, 
like Machiavelli before him, shows us that general problems of the state cannot be 
identified independently of members of society’s specific practical concerns, 
projects and activities and urges us to explicate the ties between them.  
For this reason, it is not enough to look into the imbrications of structures, 
functions and socio-historical processes that are implicated in the ways in which 
members of society pose questions of the state, we must also address the 
circumstances within which these questions become meaningful, significant, 
consequential in the specific ways that they do. Rather than treat the problem of 
the state as having a timeless validity, or trans-historical relevance, investigations 
would concentrate on looking at the implications of raising particular questions at 
the specific moments in time and the specific places in which they were raised. 
Proceeding in this way the ground is thus prepared for a respecification of the 
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‘classical’ problem of the state in and through empirical investigations of social and 
political practices. The central contention advanced in this book is that it is in this 
sense that ‘the problem of the state’ can best be addressed, i.e., by returning ‘the 
problem’ to its home environment, namely our practices, including the disputes 
and conflicts that both surround and arise out of them. 
 
Chapter Eight: What We Talk About 
When We Talk About The State 
 
As a way of concluding my third order study of the study of the state, in this, the 
final chapter of the book, I return to a question initially raised in its opening 
chapters: namely, what are we talking about when we talk about the state? The 
arguments up to this point have been geared to showing that we will not find an 
answer to that question in constitution or construction treated in isolation because 
the problem of the state resists narrow treatment in those terms. A focus on either 
can be illuminating but can also be misleading, depending on the circumstances. 
Crucially, however, it is the circumstances which determine which is the case. The 
work of Marx and Machiavelli, and indeed Weber when freed from neo-Weberian 
interpretations, encourages us to examine the ways in which the problem of the 
state arises in and as part of social and political affairs for those engaged in them. 
In so doing, that work allows us to dissolve the problems of constitution and 
construction by reminding us that we do not need to extend primacy to either, or 
indeed anything else. Our task on this view is to see how the problem of the state 
acquires whatever practical relevance and urgency it has in concrete socio-political 
circumstances and take our lead from that. By taking that lead, I have argued, we 
can re-ground our studies and acquire a clarity on the problem of the state it is all 
too easy to otherwise lose. However, I am not the only voice arguing for the need 
to re-ground our inquiries into the problem of the state and in this chapter I turn 
my attention to recent work by two of the most prominent figures in this field on 
that front: Bob Jessop and Bruno Latour. This involves a shift in focus away from 
empirical research because their work, like mine, is also of the third-order. While 
they do not offer studies of the state per se, in other words, they do offer meta-
methodological frameworks designed to guide such studies, albeit in Latour’s case 
indirectly so. Taking up the question of what we talk about when we talk about the 
state from a different angle, I highlight the points at which the work of both aligns 
with the position I have argued for in previous chapters as well as where they 
depart from it. The key issue of contention concerns ontology, our commitment to 
theories of what there is and what there can be, and whether we need to take a 
stance on it – Jessop and Latour both believe we do, I believe we do not. Treated 
as methodologists on a weak reading which brackets out and ignores the 
ontological aspects of their positions, I argue it is possible to learn much from the 
work of both; but when read on the basis of the strong ontological claims they 
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advance, however, their frameworks raise many problems. This is primarily 
because those frameworks disguise the crucial point that we learn from members 
of social and political communities what we could be talking of in talking of the 
problem of the state – and hence of the kind of problem the problem of the state 
could be – not from metaphysical schemas designed to define the forms that 
problem does or could possibly take. We are not nor could we be legislators in this 
domain and we need to avoid subordinating our phenomena to our intellectual 
preoccupations or treating what we find in the world as reflecting our investigative 
orientation to it for that very reason. The problem of the state isn’t ours as social 
and political scientists; it belongs to social and political practice and ought to be 
studied in those practices’ own terms. 
 
